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Introduction 
Investigating Nuclear Weapons in a New Era 
MUTHlAH ALAGAPPA 
Nuclear forces continue to play a critical role in the defense ofthe 
United States, its allies, and friends. They provide a credible deterrent 
[against] a wide range of threats ... [and] give the United States 
options ... to achieve strategic and political objectives. 
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 2002 
Russia [considers] nuclear deterrence as the main element guaranteeing 
its security. Maintaining a minimally sufficient number of nuclear 
weapons to ensure nuclear deterrence remains one of the most important 
policy priorities. Vladimir Putin, 2006 
China maintains a small but effective counterattacking nuclear force in 
order to deter possible attacks by other countries. Any such attack will 
inevitably result in a retaliatory nuclear counterstrike. 
PRC Defense White Paper, zooo 
India seeks to develop a "credible minimum deterrent" nuclear capability 
and adheres to a no first use policy ... Nuclear retaliation to a first strike 
will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. 
Indian Cabinet Committee on Security, 2003 
We were compelled to show then, in May 1998, that we were not 
bluffing, and in May 2002 we were compelled to show that we do 
not bluff. Pervez Aclusharraf, 2002 
Israel won't say ... whether we have nuclear weapons. It suffices that one 
fears that we have them and that fear in itself constitutes an element of 
dissuasion. Shimon Peres, 2006 
North Korea has built nuclear weapons to cope with the U.S. nuclear 
threat and is prepared to counter any U.S. pre-emptive strike. 
Mityu ]osotl, March 2006 
To cope with the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan continues to rely 
on the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States ... [It] will ... 
introduce ballistic missile defense systems to cope effectively with 
ballistic missile attacks. National Defense Program G11idelines, 2005 
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Leaders and governments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the 
nuclear club believe that their nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance 
national security by providing a capability to counter specific threats; to achieve 
certain policy priorities; to demonstrate national power; to preserve freedom of 
action; or as insurance against uncertainty and risks in a changing international 
environment. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have en-
tered or reentered the security thinking of the old, new, and prospective nuclear 
weapon states and their allies in a fundamentally different strategic environment 
and in a nuclear era that is substantially different from that of the Cold War. This 
study investigates the purposes and roles of nuclear weapons in the new security 
environment, the nature and content of the national nuclear strategies of relevant 
states, and their implications for international security and stability in the new 
era with the focus on the Asian security region. The latter is now a core world 
region and could become the geopolitical center of the world in the twenty-first 
century. 
Persistence of Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear weapons played a central role in defining the strategic relations be-
tween the two superpowers-the United States and the former Soviet Union-
and their key allies during the Cold War. At times, considerations relating to the 
strategic balance even eclipsed the underlying political struggle. Nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles dramatically elevated the importance of the strategy of de-
terrence (dissuasion by threat of enormous destruction known in the nuclear jar-
gon as deterrence by threat of punishment) and downgraded strategies of defense 
(known as deterrence by denial) and offense.1 From an "occasional stratagem" 
deterrence became an elaborate and comprehensive strategy that shaped all aspects 
of the national security policies of the two superpowers and a cornerstone of inter-
national politics (Morgan 2003: 3-4). After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, avoiding 
war between the United States and the former Soviet Union became a central 
strategic goal of the two adversaries. Most political, strategic, and technological 
developments were evaluated in terms of their consequence for the stability of 
deterrence between the two superpowers, often associated with a set of strategic 
circumstances referred to as "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). Beginning in 
the 1970s, arms control agreements were designed to preserve strategic stability 
through mutual deterrence, and to prevent war. Nuclear weapons were credited 
for the "long peace" among the major powers during the Cold War (Gaddis 1987; 
Jervis 1989: 23-24; Morgan 2003: 27-28). 2 
Termination of the Cold War, which coincided with the dawn of the informa-
tion age, raised doubts about the relevance and role of nuclear weapons in the new 
era. For reasons discussed below, initially there was a marked lack of interest in 
nuclear weapons in the so-called first and second worlds. The heyday of nuclear 
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weapons was deemed over; nuclear weapons were expected to play only a limited 
security role in the new era. This was reflected in the U.S. Department ofDe-
fense 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which stated "nudear weapons are 
playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any other time in the nuclear age." 
A concerted effort was made in the 1990s to freeze the nuclear order and move 
toward a comprehensive ban on testing in the hope of ridding the earth of nuclear 
weapons. In Asia, however, interest in nuclear weapons was undiminished by the 
termination of the Cold War. In fact the U.S.-dominated new international order 
combined with developments in the Asian security region and the international 
attempt to freeze the nuclear order, increased the incentives for ceitain countries 
to openly declare their nuclear weapon status and for others to accelerate acquisi-
tion and modernization of their nuclear arsenals. These developments, together 
with concerns over new security challenges and strategic uncertainty, contributed 
to renewed interest in nuclear weapons in the West as well. The net result has been 
increased attention to nuclear and missile forces in national security strategies. 
Initial Disinterest in the West 
Termination of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union quickly 
ended the centrality of nuclear weapons in national and international security in 
the first and second worlds. For about a decade there was a marked lack of inter-
est in the security role of nuclear weapons. The lack of interest may be traced 
most fundamentally to the disappearance of the security rationaJe brought about 
by two interrelated transformations: change in the structure of the international 
system from bipolarity to unipolarity and the development of cordial relations 
between the Western powers and Russia. Demonstrating that arms, including 
nuclear weapons, are in large measure symptomatic and a consequence of politi-
cal conflict, the two transformations quickly eliminated the centrality of nuclear 
weapons in relations among these countries. This, however, did not lead to the 
abandonment of nuclear weapons. Both inertia and concern over uncertainty 
caused the United States, Russia, France, and Britain to retain sizable nuclear 
arsenals. 
A second reason for neglect of the security role of nuclear weapons was the 
changed international security situation and the focus on "new" threats like ter-
rorism, rogue states, ethnic and religious conflicts, and pandemics (avian flu, HIV/ 
AIDS, etc.). Such concerns redirected scholarly and policy community atten-
tion to "nontraditional" security threats arising from intrastate conflicts, "failed 
states," transnational terrorist networks and organizations, and rogue states. In 
this context, work on nuclear weapons and traditional interstate security seemed 
irrelevant and unfashionable. Concern with nuclear proliferation and nuclear ter-
rorism, however, was an exception. Although proliferation was always a concern, 
the difference was that during the Cold War it ranked below the nuclear threat the 
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two superpowers posed to each other. In the post-Cold War era, nuclear prolifera-
tion moved up the security agenda to become the primary concern for the United 
States and the Western international community. Nuclear proliferation became an 
even more acute concern in the post-9/rr era. President George W. Bush identi-
fied "the gravest danger" confronting the United States as lying "at the crossroads 
of radicalism and technology."3 The states of concern for him were Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran, which he collectively termed the "axis of evil."4 Religious ter-
rorist groups also became a concern. Though the probability is low that religious 
terrorist groups will be able to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities, their interest 
in doing so and the belief that tt;aditional deterrence will not work against those 
groups underscore the concern with nuclear terrorism. 
A third reason for the disinterest in the security roles of nuclear weapons was 
rooted in a reading of the Cold War as a highly dangerous era in which peace 
rested on a "delicate balance of terror" and threat of mutual annihilation that 
should never be repeated. In this view, nuclear weapons were dangerous and im-
moral and should be delegitimized and denaturalized. The proper focus should be 
on "cooperative nuclear threat reduction" that includes securing weapons and fis-
sile material, especially in Russia and the former Soviet republics, preventing nu-
clear proliferation, and moving toward comprehensive disarmament. The world 
would be safer without nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation became the dominant 
lens for viewing nuclear weapons and security. It came to be seen as an end in 
itself rather than one of several approaches to a safer world. Downplaying or dis-
regarding the changing strategic environment and national security imperatives, 
all proliferation was condemned. 5 A strong effort was made to indefinitely extend 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Fourth, the antinuclear vision was reinforced by uncertainty over the role of 
nuclear weapons in the information age. Warfare was believed to be on the cusp 
of a new revolution in which the acquisition or denial of information was the key 
to victory (Gray :.om). The anticipation was that emphasis on surveillance and in-
formation (a presumed consequence of the revolution in military affairs [RMA]) 
combined with new, more accurate, long-range, and lethal conventional weapons 
would bring about a revolution in the conduct of warfare that would reduce the 
significance of nuclear weapons. This belief was due in part to the uncertainty 
over the role of nuclear weapons in a profoundly altered world. Conventional 
military capability was seen as the more relevant and useable instrument of policy 
in the new security environment. 
A fmal reason for the lack of interest in the security role of nuclear weapons af-
ter the Cold War ended was the unwillingness to recognize the security rationales 
of the new and aspiring entrants to the club and the consequent labeling of these 
countries as "illegitimate" nuclear weapon states or "rogue" states with irrational 
leaders who cannot be deterred.6 Contesting, downplaying, or disregarding the 
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security imperatives of the new entrants and aspirants, Western scholarship in the 
"proliferation pessimism" mode emphasized the prestige that poor countries were 
apparently seeking through the acquisition of nuclear capability and th~ negative 
security, safety, and proliferation consequences that would flow from the spread of 
nuclear weapons to these states. Nonproliferation advocates, for example, argued 
the incompatibility of the third world states' logic and behavior patterns with 
Western rational deterrence concepts and stressed the possible negative safety con-
sequences arising from the technological and organizational deficiencies of new 
nuclear forces (Sagan 1994). Though not unimportant, undue focus on the spread 
of nuclear material and weapons to "rogue" states and nonstate .actors has hin-
dered serious investigation oflarger geopolitical issues; it has reduced attention to 
the salience and role of nuclear weapons in national security policies and strategies 
and their implications for regional and global interstate security and stability. 
Continued Interest in Asia 
Instead of diminishing interest in nuclear weapons, termination of the Cold 
War and regional developments stimulated interest in the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and modernization of existing nuclear arsenals in Asia. The emergence 
of the United States as the sole superpower and its unilateral effort to construct 
a world order based on its unmatched military capability created apprehensions 
in several Asian countries, including China and especially in those countries that 
Washington labeled as "rogue" states. These concerns became a key driver of nu-
clear modernization in China and the quest for nuclear weapons by North Korea 
and Iran. Developments in Asia, such as the rise of China and India, intensified 
the security apprehensions of India and Pakistan, respectively, strengthening the 
case for nuclear weapons. 
India's interest in nuclear weapons was grounded in security considerations 
relating to China and Pakistan and its vision of itself as a major power. These 
considerations were unaltered by the termination of the Cold War. In fact a rising 
China increased anxieties in India. Further, the proposed indefinite extension of 
the NPT and movement toward concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) increased the incentive for India to overtly declare its status as a nuclear 
weapon state. Likewise, Pakistan's perception of an existential threat from In-
dia remained unaltered. A rising India and improvement in U.S.-India relations 
were seen as further tilting the balance of power against Pakistan. Consequently 
Pakistan followed India in testing and declaring itself a nudear weapon state. 
Similarly the termination of the Cold War did not affect Israel's rationale for its 
nuclear force, which is grounded in its view of history and the existential threat 
it perceives in the Middle East. The belief that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon 
capability provides a new and in some ways regionally more palatable rationale for 
Israel's nuclear force. 
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Unilateralism on the part of the United States; demonstration of its might in 
the First GulfWar, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the invasion oflraq; and its empha-
sis on developing strategic defense (ballistic missile defense [BMD] and counter-
force capabilities) to make the use of force a more effective instrument of U.S. 
foreign policy created apprehensions even in major powers like China and Russia, 
contributing to modernization of their nuclear arsenals. U.S. military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to oust hostile and "despicable" regimes created fear and 
concern in North Korea and Iran that were identified by President Bush as pos-
sible military targets for regime change and destruction of their nuclear facilities. 
Along with other considerations, fear of the United States has been a key factor 
accelerating the nuclear weapon programs of North Korea and Iran. North Korea 
views its missile and nuclear weapon programs as key elements in developing a 
self-reliant capability to deter the United States. 
The rise of China, its nuclear modernization program, and the North Korean 
missile and nuclear programs also raised security concerns in Japan, contributing 
to further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and reiteration of the 
U.S. extended deterrence commitment to Japan. A rising China reinforced Indian 
apprehensions and raised concerns in Washington as well about Chinese military 
power, including nuclear modernization. Concern with China is an important 
factor in the budding strategic relations among the United States, India, and Ja-
pan. The North Korean nuclear and missile programs raised security concerns 
in Northeast Asia, particulalily in Japan and to a lesser degree in South Korea. In 
addition to seeking a more substantive demonstration ofU.S. extended deterrence 
commitment, Tokyo became more committed to the development of BMD to 
protect Japan from North Korean missile threats. Likewise, Iran's nuclear weapon 
quest created apprehensions in Israel and certain Arab states. The basic point is 
that the interest in nuclear weapons in Asia and the Middle East was not dimin-
ished by the termination of the Cold War. The new strategic environment, with a 
dominating United States and a rapidly rising China, provided additional or new 
impetus for the acquisition and development of nuclear weapon capability. 
Renewed Interest in Recognized Nuclear Weapon States 
Beginning sometime around the turn of the twenty-first century, the five rec-
ognized nuclear weapon states began to rethink the purpose, roles, and strategies 
for the employment of nuclear weapons in a new strategic era. That rethinking 
was linked to several developments but three were particularly important. First, 
after a decade of post-Cold War experiences the outlines of the new strategic 
environment were becoming more visible. Countries were in a better position 
to assess "new" security challenges and their strengths and weaknesses in cop-
ing with them. It was evident that despite and, in some ways, because of the 
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fundamental change in the security environment, nuclear weapons continued to 
be relevant although there was still uncertainty about speciflc roles and suitable 
nuclear postures. The United States, Russia, Britain, and France began to review 
and redesign their national nuclear postures for the new era. Th.e second' develop-
ment was the perceived unraveling of the Cold War nuclear order with the Indian 
and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, the nonratification of the CTBT by the Bush 
administration, Iraq's expulsion of the United Nations Special Commission (UN-
SCOM) inspectors in 1999, the gradual erosion of the 1994 Agreed Framework 
with North Korea, and revelations of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. The 
de facto expansion of the nuclear club, prospect of further increase; in the number 
of nuclear weapon states, and the heightened prospect that nomtate actors may ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability stimulated interest in how 
to cope with the new nuclear situation and threats. The third development was 
the Bush administration's geopolitics-oriented worldview, its attempt to unilater-
ally construct a world order based on U.S. predominance and values, and its heavy 
handed prosecution of the global war on tyrants and terrorists in the wake of 9/u. 
Set out boldly in several reports and speeches, these policies and especially their 
manifestation in the various military actions became a key driving force in the 
review of the U.S. nuclear posture as well as that of other cou11tries. 
Of particular relevance to this study is the 2002 NPR, which is the first sweep-
ing reappraisal of U.S. nuclear posture since the termination of the Cold War. 
Mandated by Congress, the 2002 NPR maintains that nuclear weapons play an 
important role in the defense of the United States and that they provide credible 
military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-
scale conventional military attacks. The new capability-based posture, it posits, 
should be capable of dealing with immediate contingencies (e.g., an Iraqi attack 
on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military 
confrontation over the status of Taiwan) as well as potential and unexpected con-
tingencies. It identifies North Korea, Iraq, Syria, and Libya as countries that could 
be involved in all three types of contingencies. North Korea and Iraq are identi-
fied as chronic military concerns. China is identified as a country that could be 
involved in an immediate or potential contingency. Although the United States 
seeks a cooperative relationship with Russia, the NPR states that that country 
maintains the most formidable nuclear forces aside from the United States, and 
because it confronts many instabilities Russia remains a country of concern. The 
NPR downgrades deterrence by punishment and high profiles strategies of of-
fense (preemption and prevention) and strategic defense (preemption, ballistic 
missile defense, counterforce, and passive defense). It seeks to build a new strategic 
triad with a mix of nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities to make military force a 
more useable instrument of policy. The goal is to develop a credible multipurpose 
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force with a broad array of capabilities, including a signifiCant nuclear component, 
to provide a spectrum of options in the pursuit of deterrence, assurance, offense, 
and defense. Although the programs envisioned in the NPR have not mustered 
the necessary political and funding support in the United States, and its future in 
the post-George W. Bush presidency remains uncertain, it remains official policy. 
The contents of the NPR combined with the statements and actions of the Bush 
administration, including the military action in Iraq, created apprehensions in 
several countries, forcing them to rethink their own policies and postures. 
Russia's reappraisal of its nuclear policy is a function of several developments: 
the dramatic decline in its conventional military capability and more generally its 
descent from the position of great power; its perception that the unipolar struc-
ture, the growing power and influence of the United States, its unilateral ap-
proach to international governance, and the eastward expansion of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are marginalizing Russia and threatening 
its interests in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Pacific region; and 
the belief that America's development of counterforce capability and BMD will 
negatively affect its strategic deterrent (Fedorov 2006; Sokov 2004). The reap-
praisal is also linked to the rise of China. Although Russia cooperates with China 
on several international issues and supplies advanced military technology to that 
country, a rapidly rising China is viewed in certain quarters as a long-term secu-
rity concern. After much debate in the 1990s, Russia articulated a military doc-
trine in 2000 that emphasized nuclear deterrence as the major element that will 
guarantee its international security and underscore its status as a powerful nation. 
Russia's strategic posture appears to be shifting from its Cold War orientation to 
national defense, although the specific threats that Russian nuclear forces are sup-
posed to deter remain unclear. 
Though they are not in the Asian security region, it is pertinent to observe that 
Britain and France also reviewed and reiterated their commitment to retain their 
nuclear forces in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The British govern-
ment tabled a white paper in Parliament in December 2006 arguing that it sees "an 
enduring role for the UK's nuclear forces as an essential part of our capability for 
deterring blackmail and acts of aggression against our vital interests by nuclear-
armed opponents" (Secretary of State for Defense and the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 2006). It proposes building a new class of 
submarines, participating in the U.S. life extension program for the Trident D5 
missile, and developing a replacement warhead, all with a view to maintaining an 
effective submarine and ballistic missile-based deterrent system. In March 2007 
the British House of Commons supported the plan to renew Britain's nuclear 
submarine system. French nuclear doctrine and capability have also evolved sub-
stantially. President Jacques Chirac indicated the changes in January 2006 when 
he announced a "new" nuclear deterrence doctrine (Chirac 2006). In addition 
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to deterring threats from major powers, the doctrine posits that state sponsors of 
terrorism risk nuclear retaliation, that regional powers armed with WMD and 
threatening European territory would face "absolutely unaccej>table d~mage," 
and that France has the right to "employ final warning to signif-y our determina-
tion to protect our vital interest" (Yost 2006). France has acquired or is seeking 
to acquire new air and sea capabilities for more discriminatory and controllable 
options in employing its nuclear weapons. 
Although less explicit and less transparent, China has emphasized moderniza-
tion and further development of a survivable nuclear deterrent capability as an 
integral part of its defense modernization program (State Council Information 
Office 2000). A primary purpose of nuclear modernization is to make China's 
deterrent capability more effective in the context of "new" secllrity challenges, 
including a shift in U.S. nuclear posture, U.S. development of a BMD system, 
and the entry of new nuclear powers in Asia. Deterring possible U.S. military 
intervention in the event of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait is a major purpose 
of Chinese military modernization; the role of nuclear weapons in this conflict, 
however, seems more implied than explicit. Chinese scholars and officials are be-
ginning to engage in more explicit discussion of nuclear doctrine, force posture, 
and operational planning. Arguing the case for using nuclear weapons in limited 
conflicts for escalation control and damage limitation, some Chinese officials and 
scholars advocate abandoning the policy of no first use (NFU) or at least making it 
conditional? The zoo6 China Military Power report published by the U.S. Depart-
ment ofDefense suggests that the pace and scope of the modernization of China's 
strategic nuclear forces has exceeded expectations and has the potential to alter the 
regional military balance. China's success in destroying a defunct weather satel-
lite in space with an antisatellite missile has raised concerns in the United States 
about the security of its space-based surveillance systems, with certain analysts 
arguing that it could stimulate military competition in space (e.g.,Johnson-Freese 
2007). Ashley Tellis (2007) asserts that China has surpassed the Soviet Union in 
its heyday by demonstrating a "unitary hit-to-kill payload" capability and that 
the Chinese purpose is not to compete in space-based weapons or compel the 
United States to negotiate space arms limitation agreements but to blunt the mas-
sive U.S. conventional superiority by threatening its "eyes and ears" in space. In 
his view Beijing's investment in space denial technologies is driven by strategic 
concerns, with China preparing for a prospective geopolitical rivalry with the 
United States. 
"New" Nuclear Weapon States 
Concurrent with the reorientation of national postures and the moderniza-
tion of the arsenals of the f1ve recognized nuclear weapon states, two (India and 
Pakistan) of the three undeclared nuclear weapon states that had remained outside 
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the NPT became declared nuclear weapon states after May 1998. International 
efforts to freeze and roll back their nuclear weapon programs have not been suc-
cessful. The international community appears to have accepted them as nuclear 
weapon states. Both countries view nuclear weapons as essential for national se-
curity and strategic autonomy, and they are in the process of developing doctrines 
and capabilities for an operational deterrent force. A series of crises between 1999 
and 2oo2 compelled the two countries to recognize the possible roles and limita-
tions of nuclear weapons in their security interaction. New Delhi also seeks to 
develop a deterrent capability against China. Israel is now the only undeclared 
nuclear weapon state, but it is believed to possess a substantial nuclear force that is 
comparable in numbers (though not in delivery vehicles or range) to China, Brit-
ain, or France. The Israeli government continues to be committed to an opaque 
status and existential deterrence, but a nuclear Iran may compel a reappraisal of 
the opaque nature of its nuclear arsenal and the nature of its deterrence strategy. 
Despite the assertion that it only seeks nuclear energy, the Iranian government's 
ultimate goal is widely believed to be the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at 
least the development of the necessary infrastructure to realize such a capability 
on short notice (Chubin 2006). 
North Korea is possibly the latest entrant to the nuclear club. The govern-
ment in Pyongyang declared North Korea a nuclear weapon state after a partially 
successful low-yield atomic test on October 9, 2006. Producing widespread in-
ternational condemnation, the test has been depicted as a threat to the national 
security of the United States and Japan, as increasing the prospects for the spread 
of nuclear weapons and material to additional states and nonstate actors, and gen-
erally as a threat to international peace and security with far-reaching strategic 
consequences for Northeast Asia. Pyongyang, however, sees the test, and more 
broadly its nuclear and missile programs, as a vital element in developing a self-
reliant deterrent capability focused in the short to medium term against a per-
ceived U.S. threat, including preemptive action.8 In the long term, the capability 
may be seen as insurance to reduce North Korea's vulnerability and increase its 
options toward China, Japan, and Russia. 
North Korea's nuclear test has reinforced apprehensions among U.S. allies 
in Northeast Asia, particularly in Japan. Although Japan has since reaffirmed its 
nonnuclear stance, certain political leaders and influential opinion makers have 
called for an open debate on Japan's nuclear future. Tokyo also sought reaffirma-
tion of Washington's extended nuclear deterrence commitment. And support for 
Japanese participation in the American BMD effort has solidified. Though less 
concerned about North Korea's nuclear program, South Korea too sought reaf-
firmation ofWashington's extended nuclear deterrence commitment in the wake 
of the test. 
Introduction II 
Nuclear Erzergy Renaissance 
A final reason for increased international concern with nuclear weapons is 
linked to the worldwide renewed interest in nuclear energy and the potential 
for diversion of weapon-grade plutonium to undesirable state and nonstate ac-
tors. Rising fossil fuel cost, energy security concerns, favorable changes in nuclear 
technology and nuclear energy economics, and concern over the environment 
have all contributed to a nuclear energy renaissance (Holton 2005). The United 
States, Britain, France, Japan, Australia, China, and India along with many other 
countries envision nuclear energy as a central component of their. energy policy. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that sixty new nuclear power 
plants will be built in the next fifteen years. Meeting the growing global demand 
for energy requires investment, trade, and nuclear energy-related technology 
transfer to ensure reliable supplies of reactor fuel to bona fide users. At the same 
time the international community is concerned about nuclear proliferation and 
seeks to put in place adequate international safeguards to lower the risk of diver-
sion of proliferation-sensitive parts for noneconomic purposes (ElBaradei 2006). 
Continued Security Relevance 
The preceding overview and the epigraphs to this introduction suggest that 
nuclear weapons will persist and influence national security policies and strategies 
of major powers, certain second-tier powers, as well as isolated states in the foresee-
able future, with consequences for national and international security. Initial antic-
ipation in the West especially in the arms control and nonproliferation community 
of the decreasing security relevance of nuclear weapons was ill-founded. The effort 
in the last decade and a half to arrest and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons 
has not been any more successful than earlier ones. The United States and Russia 
have each undertaken to drastically cut back their nuclear arsenals, but at the end 
of the day they still would have large nuclear forces. And each is trying to develop 
new capabilities that would increase the effectiveness of their respective arsenals in 
new missions and blunt those of others. Other nuclear weapon states are building 
and modernizing their nuclear arsenals to retain or increase their robustness with a 
view to increasing their military options. The number of declared nuclear weapon 
states has increased and may further increase although only gradually. Nuclear 
weapons will continue to be relevant in the foreseeable future. It is imperative to 
investigate their security roles and implications. This is especially important in 
light of the dramatically altered security environment and a new nuclear age. 
Unipolar System with Multiple Security Dynamics 
Termination of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union, and its succes-
sion by a weak Russia fundamentally altered the structure and dynamics of the 
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international political system. Unipolarity replaced bipolarity. Early hopes and 
predictions that unipolarity would be short ljved and the system would soon be-
come multipolar have not been realized.9 It is now commonly accepted that uni-
polarity will continue for another decade or two, possibly longer. At the same time 
it is widely anticipated that rising Asian powers, especially a fast rising China, and 
a united and expanding Europe will increasingly constrain U.S. dominance not 
only in Asia and Europe but also globally. In a few decades from now the interna-
tional system could become multipolar, with the United States still remaining first 
among equals. The anticipated transition is contingent on the continued growth 
and modernization of Asian powers and the unity and ability of the European 
Union to act in a concerted m~nner in the political and security arenas. 
Unlike the Soviet-American ideological and military confrontation that un-
dergirded and shaped international politics and security in almost every region 
of the world during the Cold War, the post-I990 unipolar system does not have a 
single integrating security dynamic. Instead it is characterized by multiple dynam-
ics flowing from the attempt of the United States to unilaterally construct a new 
world order based on its dominance and values (democracy, human rights, market 
economy); the interaction of the predominant United States with rising powers 
(principally in Asia with a focus on China); the U.S.-led global war on terrorism 
(GWT) that is enmeshed in local and domestic conflicts over political system, 
legitimacy, and national identity; unresolved regional conflicts in Asia (Taiwan, 
Korea, and Kashmir); concern over the spread of nuclear weapons, especially to 
so-called rogue states and terrorist groups; increasing economic interdependence 
and integration at the regional level; and economic globalization. Although there 
are some unresolved regional disputes and long-range apprehensions, there is no 
deep cleavage or confrontation among the major powers that overrides other con-
siderations. The contemporary political, security, and economic dynamics are not 
necessarily congruent. Competing political, traditional security, and economic 
priorities and dynamics imply that states have to continuously balance short- and 
long-term interests within and across sectors. 
The United States, Russia, and the Asian powers are all subject to multiple and 
competing dynamics, including interdependence, cooperation, conflict, and con-
frontation. Threat perceptions vary widely, with certain countries being viewed 
simultaneously as friend, partner, and potential security threat. Several states con-
front multiple threats of unequal urgency; threats are often long range and seldom 
articulated explicitly; only in a few cases is the threat perception clear and urgent 
(between North Korea and the United States, Taiwan and China, and Pakistan and 
India). The numerous explicit and "quiet" rivalries (China-United States, China-
Russia, Russia-United States, India-China, Pakistan-India, North Korea-United 
States, Japan-North Korea, Japan-China, Taiwan-China, and South Korea-
North Korea) make for a complex security environment with crosscutting lines 
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of amity and enmity. This is compounded by widespread regional anticipation of 
change in the distribution of power and uncertainty over the "ultimate" configu-
ration of power in the Asian security system. The numerous rivalries, ant~cipation 
of strategic change, and uncertainty contribute to the perception of a region in 
strategic flux and provides stimulus for military modernization to deal with un-
expected developments. 
Security during the Cold War was globaL Regional security then was en-
twined with and subsumed by the global Soviet-American confrontation. Today 
security is largely regionaL Although the United States is the sole global power, 
it has not been able to define the international security environm~nt in terms of 
threats or architecture for managing security. Despite its efforts, the GWT and 
democratic development have not become primary drivers of international politics 
and security. Further, there is no political and security counterpart to economic 
globalization. Political and security dynamics have become largely regional. The 
United States is a key player in many regions but all other significant actors are 
largely regional players. The European Union is significant in adjacent areas but 
its security role in Asia or Latin America, for example, is limited. Likewise al-
though the reach of Asian countries is expanding, their security role is effectively 
limited to Asia and adjoining regions. In geography as well as in substance, the 
contemporary international security environment is dramatically different from 
that of the Cold War. 
A New Nuclear Age 
Likewise, the contemporary nuclear environment, which has been referred to 
as the second or new nuclear age, is substantively different from that during the 
Cold War. At first glance the nuclear situation in contemporary Asia might appear 
rudimentary. A closer look, however, suggests a more complex nuclear environ-
ment that differs from that of the Cold War era in significa11t ways. Six major 
differences are discernible: asymmetry as the dominant condition, increasing sa-
lience of defense against nuclear weapons, blurring of the nuclear-conventional 
distinction, spread of nuclear weapons to more states, concern that nonstate actors 
will acquire nuclear weapons, and renewed interest in nuclear energy. 
Asymmetry 
A key difference is the condition of asymmetry created by the huge disparity in 
military capabilities, including those in the nuclear arena. Asymmetry did charac-
terize the context for nuclear thinking in the early period of the Cold War when 
the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly into the mid-1950s and nuclear 
superiority well into the I96os. Asymmetry also characterized nuclear thinking in 
Britain, France, and China (Goldstein 2000). It informed the U.S. effort to cope 
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with Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, and it is possible (though not 
clear) that the Soviet Union was also seized with asymmetry in the early phase 
of the Cold War. Nevertheless, parity and mutual vulnerability between the two 
superpowers were the defining parameters in thinking about nuclear strategy 
from the mid-196os onward. 
In contrast, asymmetry is now the defining condition and the basis for strategic 
thinking and planning in nearly all nuclear weapon states. Asymmetry is mani-
fest in the wide spectrum and many gradations in nuclear and missile capabilities 
that range from covert programs to develop nuclear weapons (North Korea and 
Iran), substantial but opaque nuclear capability (Israel), through minimum deter-
rence postures (India and Pakistan), a limited strategic triad (China), a shrinking 
conventional capability but still extensive range of nuclear capabilities (Russia), 
to a wide array of conventional and nuclear weapon capabilities possessed by the 
United States which it is trying to further expand. (For details about the nuclear 
weapon capabilities of states in the Asian security region, see Table I-1.) 
Because of the overall power and technological differentials, nuclear and con-
ventional asymmetry appears unlikely to be bridged in the foreseeable future. 
Asian nuclear forces would be much smaller than Russian and American forces. 
China is likely to make important advancements in its nuclear and missile arsenals 
but is unlikely to catch up with Russia or the United States, and Russian forces 
will continue to be more limited than those of the United States. Despite a sub-
stantial reduction in the number of warheads and the budgetary constraints on the 
development of new systems, the United States is likely to enjoy nuclear superior-
ity for at least a few more decades. Asymmetry has important implications for the 
basis for deterrence, the construction of survivable nuclear forces, incentives for 
development of first strike capabilities, and crisis stability and instability. 
Ballistic Missile Deftnse 
The development and deployment of BMD constitutes the second and pos-
sibly the fundamental technological difference between today and the Cold War. 
Bernard Brodie (1946, 1959) emphasized that the significance of nuclear weapons 
"depends above all on the possibilities of defense against them in strategic attack." 
He stressed that all "conclusions about strategies and national policies must be 
largely governed by our estimate of probabilities for the future of defense" {1959: 
173). Although there was always interest, effective defense against nuclear weap-
ons was deemed not possible. Even if it had been possible, strategic defense was 
considered undesirable because it would threaten the strategic stability embodied 
in MAD. Mutual vulnerability and deterrence based on assured retaliation domi-
nated security thinking during the Cold War, especially in the United States. The 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that brought the fmt debate on ballistic 
missile defense (1965-72) to a conclusion embodied this understanding and was 
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justified primarily in terms of strengthening deterrence by protecting second-
strike capability (Freedman 2004: 19). 
A radical departure in thinking came in 1983. Seeking to escape from deter-
rence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation and mutual annihilation, President 
Ronald Reagan tasked the scientific community to explore the feasibility of stra-
tegic defense against nuclear ballistic missiles (Payne 1985). The idea elicited deep 
skepticism and was even ridiculed, and it failed to achieve much progress owing 
to technological limitations and the waning of the Cold War, but the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) did establish a national research program. Strategic de-
fense gained new prominence during the George W. Bush administration, which 
scrapped the distinction between strategic and theater missile defensl" and made 
the development of missile defense a high priority. The U.S. commitment to de-
velop and deploy a layered system to defend itself, its allies, and its friends against 
ballistic missile threats from "rogue" states, and the attraction of such systems to 
America's allies, such as Japan and Taiwan, complicate the strategic picture and 
calculations of Russia and China, which for the moment oppose such systems 
(Berry 2005; Ferguson 2ooo; Glaser and Fetter 2001; International Institute for 
Strategic Studies [IISS] 2004). 
Thus far, missile defense development has been limited in scope, and the small 
number of tests under favorable conditions has had only partial SLtccess. Accord-
ing to Philip Coyle, the U.S. missile defense program is still struggling to deal 
with threats from decoys and countermeasures (Coyle 2002, 2006). Even if U.S. 
interceptors become more effective against threats posed by states like North Ko-
rea and Iran in the next several years (it should be noted here that for the present 
both these countries do not have long-range missiles that can reach the United 
States), the United States is still quite far from the development of effective de-
fense against more substantial nuclear threats from countries such. as Russia and 
China that do have nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach the United States and 
which can deploy decoys and countermeasures. Despite the substantial research 
and development investments by the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Europe on 
tactical missile defense, the technology for such a system is also not proven. Fur-
ther, such systems can be relatively easily countered by the development of more 
missiles (Coyle 2006). 
However, if strategic defense against substantial threats becomes more effec-
tive, it could alter the balance between deterrence and offense, with far-reaching 
strategic consequences for the relationship between force and statecraft, for stabil-
ity, and for the salience of small nuclear forces. With effective strategic defense, 
the assumption of mutual vulnerability that was at the heart of strategic thinking 
during the Cold War would become suspect. States with effective shields will 
have the option to exit from the MAD situation. The sword may become more 
potent and usable. The counterforce role may gain new prominence. For those 
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without 01. missile defense system, force protection and effectiveness in penetrating 
the adversary's BMD system would assume high priority. Striking first could be-
come attractive. Much more effort would be required to establish mutual vulner-
ability and stability. Credible minimum deterrence might require larger and more 
accurate forces. Development of effective missile defense would fundamentally 
alter the significance of nuclear forces, especially small ones. The implications of 
missile defense have not commanded much attention because of the continuing 
belief that effective defense against nuclear threats is technologically still not fea-
sible. Only a few scholars have attempted systematic exploration of related ques-
tions (Glaser 1990; Glaser and Fetter 2001; Kartchner 2005; Powell 2003). 
Blurring of the Nuclear-Conventional Distinction 
The third difference lies in the development oflong-range, highly lethal con-
ventional weapons that can be deployed in roles previously assigned to nuclear 
weapons, and the development of small and more precise nuclear warheads that 
can be employed in bunker busting and targeting conventional military assets. 
These developments muddy the hitherto relatively clear distinction between con-
ventional and nuclear war and could have implications for the integrity of the 
nuclear threshold and for stability. The so-called RMA also threatens to out-
mode existing conventional military forces. It provides the United States a level of 
conventional military power-demonstrated in operations in the First GulfWar, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq-that creates apprehension in other states.10 The RMA 
advantages the strong; nuclear weapons might become an even more important 
means to cope with superior conventional military force (see, e.g., Metz and Ki-
evit 1994). Although the RMA may revolutionize conventional military engage-
ments, it does not undo the nuclear revolution (Gray 200I). 
Increase in the Number of Nuclear Weapon States 
A fourth difference between the contemporary and the Cold War nuclear en-
vironment is in the increase in the number of nuclear weapon states. The number 
of overt nuclear weapon states has increased from five to seven, with Israel still 
maintaining its opaque status. Although India and Pakistan had already developed 
nuclear weapon capabilities during the Cold War, their move to overt status ne-
cessitates further development of their nuclear postures, capabilities, command 
and control arrangements, doctrines, and strategies. North Korea is a new entrant, 
and Iran is widely believed to be seeking nuclear weapons. In reality, the spread 
of nuclear weapons has been more gradual than the alarmist readings of nonpro-
liferation advocates. 
However, even a small increase in the number of nuclear weapon states poses 
challenges for the existing nuclear order (ElBaradei 2006). First there is the ques-
tion of how to deal with nuclear weapon states that are outside the NPT system. 
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The U.S.-India nuclear deal grounded in U.S. long-term strategic thinking is an 
attempt to deal with this issue on a country-specific basis. How to deal with Paki-
stan, Israel, and North Korea (if the effort to dismantle its nuclear program is only 
partially successful) remains a issue. Second is the issue of additional pro-
liferation. There is international concern that successful nuclear quests by North 
Korea and Iran would set off a new wave of proliferation in Northeast Asia and 
the Middle East. Nonproliferation experts see the spread of naclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles primarily as a threat to the existing regimes. An equally if not 
more important challenge is how to adapt these institutions to changing condi-
tions. Failure to adapt will undermine them. 
Finally, an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states raises the issue of 
stability. Some argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is destabilizing, while 
others argue that it can have stabilizing effects (Knopf 2002; Sagan and Waltz 
1995). Based largely on deductive reasoning and extrapolating behavior from the 
Cold War or discarding that experience altogether, the stability-instability debate 
is unlikely to be resolved. Nevertheless, it draws attention to th.e possible implica-
tions of the spread of nuclear weapons to more states. Although proliferation and 
stability were also concerns during the Cold War, the present situation is deemed 
to be different because of the close proximity of the new nuclear weapon states 
and the intractable conflicts between them (India-Pakistan and Israel-Iran), the 
totalitarian or theocratic nature and/or fragility of regimes (North Korea, Iran, 
and Pakistan), their irrational and "roguish" behavior (North Korea, Iran, and 
Pakistan), and because of safety concerns (Buchan et al. 2003: 22-23). The United 
States and the Soviet Union did not share a politically significant boundary, and 
their heartlands were separated by thousands of miles, allowing space and time for 
response in crisis situations. Although China and Russia, and China and India, 
border each other, their heartlands are also relatively far apart. In other dyads 
(India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, North Korea-Japan, and North Korea-China), how-
ever, Asian nuclear powers are neighbors or very dose to each other with very 
short missile flight times between major cities. In nearly every case, political 
boundaries are sensitive and disputed, or there is a high degree of mistrust and 
conflict. Some of these states are also fragile, with the potential for regime col-
lapse and change. All these considerations have implications for force posture, 
force security, and crisis stability. The spread of nuclear weapons to more states, 
along with the multiplicity of threats, also necessitate thinking about nuclear 
strategy, and especially deterrence, as a complex multisided enterprise rather than 
in the more familiar bilateral mode. 
Nuclear Terrorism 
The concern that nuclear weapons may be acquired and 11sed by terrorist or-
ganizations is peculiar to the contemporary era. The belief is that if terrorist 
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organizations like Al-Qaeda were able to obtain such weapons, including dirty 
bombs, they would not hesitate to use them to attack populated areas in order to 
cause widespread death and fear. Proliferation to nonstate actors and nuclear ter-
rorism have become major security concerns. Concerns under the heading of nu-
clear terrorism include theft of nuclear weapons or material, assistance to terrorist 
organizations by rogue states and black market networks like that of A. Q. Khan, 
attacks on nuclear facilities, and takeover of a collapsing nuclear weapon state by 
radical Islamic groups (Braun and Chyba 2004; Frost 2005; Sokolski 2006). Some 
have argued that the threat is exaggerated (Frost 2005); even if they acquire such 
weapons, terrorists are likely, to use them strategically rather than in a punitive 
manner (Schelling 2oo6); and that deterrence can work against such threats. 
Most analysts agree that the probability of terrorist organizations acquiring 
or producing nuclear weapons is rather low. However, given the enormity of 
destruction that can be caused, even a minuscule risk is considered too high. 
How to prevent the spread of nuclear material and weapons to nonstate actors is 
a key question that has to be addressed by the contemporary international com-
munity. This becomes more challenging when certain states are believed to be 
aiding and abetting terrorist groups or are in danger of failing. Another key ques-
tion is how to deal with a nonstate actor that somehow comes into possession 
of nuclear weapons. How can deterrence be made to work against such groups? 
Deterrence against nonstate actors is commanding increasing policy and scholarly 
attention (Allison 2006; Galluci 2006). Transnational actors with nuclear weapons 
pose novel challenges to the construction and management of security order in a 
system of states. It compels us to think the unthinkable--about nuclear weapon 
roles, strategies, and implications outside the interstate system. 
From the preceding overview it is clear that the contemporary nuclear context 
is significantly different from that of the post-196os Cold War era. However, it is 
similar to the early period of the Cold War in two respects. One, both periods 
are formative. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were engaged in developing nuclear capabilities and strategies to deal with a new 
situation brought about by the nuclear revolution and the bipolar ideological and 
military confrontation. There was no established body of knowledge to draw 
on. The new civilian strategy analysts (Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and 
Herman Kahn, among others) considered earlier work by military strategists to 
be irrelevant to the new situation. The contemporary period is formative not so 
much from a technological perspective, but in the political-strategic context. 11 
All states are rethinking their security policies, including nuclear policy and strat-
egy, in the context of a radically altered strategic environment. Such rethink-
ing, and this is the second similarity, is informed by the condition of asymmetry 
that was also a key parameter in the 1950s and early 1960s. The difference, how-
ever, is that nuclear weapons were central to the security thinking in the early 
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Cold War era. Today they appear less central and their role more indirect, but 
salient nevertheless. 
Necessity, Opportunity, and Difficulty 
In light of the dramatically altered strategic and nuclear environments and the 
persistence and in certain cases expansion of nuclear arsenals, it is imperative to 
investigate the "new" roles and strategies for the employment of nuclear weapons. 
The ideas and lessons from the Cold War experience with nuclear weapons may 
or may not be relevant. We need a firm empirically grounded understanding of 
the role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary era and to develdp "new" ideas 
and concepts. Such a study is opportune because we can now draw on almost two 
decades of post-Cold War experience. The contours of the transformed Asian se-
curity landscape and the new driving forces of change like the rise of Asian pow-
ers are becoming clearer (see Chapter I). The ongoing reappraisal, modernization, 
and development of national nuclear doctrines and capabilities also provide a good 
vantage point to comparatively investigate the role of nuclear weapons in Asian 
security. Some may consider two decades of experience insufficient evidentiary 
basis. Others have justified theoretical inquiry on the ground that the five de-
cades of Cold War experience are insufficient because of their ambiguous nature 
(Harknett, Wirtz, and Paul2oo1: 4). We have to go with what we have. History is 
always subject to different interpretation across actors and over time. There is no 
definitive history. By design this study is empirically grounded. Though informed 
by relevant concepts and theories, it is not theory driven. 
A few studies have investigated certain concepts and strategies (for example 
the history and relevance of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War era), nu-
clear policies and strategies of specific countries (the United States, Russia, India, 
China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran), the role of nuclear weapons in specific 
conflicts or dyads (India-Pakistan and United States-China), or speciflc problems 
(nuclear proliferation, for example). However, there have been very few or no sys-
tematic comparative inquiries of national roles and strategies of all relevant states 
or explorations of their implications for security, stability, and conflict resolution 
in the Asian security region as a whole. This study seeks to make a modest con-
tribution in this direction. It includes a reconsideration of conceptual and policy 
issues and illuminates their signiflcance through the study of the nuclear policies 
and strategies of most of the countries that are likely to play a major role not only 
in Asian international relations but also in the twenty-first-century world. 
Such an investigation is also difficult. Information on nuclear forces and strat-
egies is relatively thin and often highly classified. There is also a tendency to 
secrecy and ambiguity in the belief that hiding limitations enhances the security 
value of the relatively small nuclear forces of Asian states. Difficulty also arises 
from the fact that nuclear strategies are in an early stage or at turning points with 
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limited consensus on policy, posture, and strategy. In the case of Asian states, ca-
pabilities are often limited and do not match the requirements of professed strate-
gies. Doctrines tend to be vague and in outline form. It is necessary to distinguish 
between declaratory policy, operational strategies, and actual behavior in crisis 
situations. These considerations will make analysis more difficult. 
Purpose of Study 
The central purpose of the study is to develop an intellectual framework and 
~ strong empirical base for understanding and theorizing about nuclear weapons 
m the context of a dramatically altered international security environment. To 
enable this, a crucial first step is to develop a deep understanding in comparative 
perspective of the purposes and roles assigned to nuclear weapons in the security 
thinking and practice of relevant states and to explore their implications for re-
gional security, stability, and conflict resolution. With this in mind, this bottom-
up study investigates three sets of issues: 
I. The purposes, roles, strategies, and significance of national nuclear forces. 
The study explores the security problems, threats, and contingencies for 
which nuclear weapons are deemed relevant (or irrelevant), the specific 
roles assigned to nuclear weapons in dealing with them, the basic nuclear 
strategies of states, how these have been framed and operationalized, and 
if they are likely to alter. It also investigates the relationship of nuclear 
weapons to conventional military capability and to other instruments of 
policy to ascertain their overall salience in national security policy. 
2. Commonalities and differences. The study explores similarities and differ-
ences across countries in the relevance and roles assigned to nuclear weap-
ons and in nuclear strategies to ascertain if there is anything distinctive 
about nuclear security in Asia, and if a common vocabulary and discourse 
is evolving. 
3- Regional implications. Here the study explores the implications of na-
tional nuclear capabilities and strategies for regional security structure and 
dynamics, if they have hindered or fostered conflict resolution, and their 
impact on stability in the Asian security region. 
Findings of the Study 
The study advances five propositions on the significance and role of nuclear 
weapons in national security strategies and three propositions on the implications 
of nuclear weapons for security and stability in the Asian security region. Before 
outlining them, I would like to stress that these propositions must be considered a 
first cut, a basis for further research, debate, and refinement. 
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SignificatUe cif Nuclear Weapons in National Security Strategies 
On the significance of nuclear weapons, the study first posits that they play an 
indirect but important role with far-reaching implications. On the surface, nuclear 
weapons appear less central, often an adjunct to conventional military force that 
seems more significant in dealing with the many security challenges confronting 
Asian states. Even in the situations in which nuclear weapons are relevant, they 
appear to be in the background augmenting conventional forces and deterrence. 
The emphasis on modernizing conventional military capabilities would appear to 
support such a line of thinking. However, a closer look suggests tha~ the influence 
of nuclear weapons runs deeper. 
Nuclear weapons cast a long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the na-
tional security strategies of major powers and their strategic interactions. Nuclear 
weapons induce caution, set limits to military options in conflict management, 
require careful management of crisis situations, shape the way conventional force 
is used, and provide foundational insurance in situations of conventional mili-
tary imbalance and against unanticipated developments. Under certain conditions 
nuclear weapons can also enhance bargaining leverage. Likewise, the nuclear um-
brella is a key defining parameter in the national security strategies of allied states, 
including their decision not to acquire nuclear weapons. For states with existential 
security concerns, nuclear weapons are bedrock "weapons of the weak." They 
are the ultimate security insurance to guarantee survival. By setting limits and 
shaping the way force and the threat of force may be used, nuclear weapons pro-
vide the all-important context for the management of key regional conflicts. In 
the absence of deep ideological conflict and strategic military confrontation like 
that during the Cold War, nuclear weapons are likely to continue to remain in 
the background but deeply influence the national security strategies of relevant 
states and international politics in the Asian security region. The concern that 
certain nonstate actors may acquire nuclear weapons also exerts a deep influence 
on national and international security threat perceptions, security policies, and 
strategies, including the prosecution of the global war on terrorism. The possible 
acquisition of the "ultimate" weapon by nons tate actors poses novel challenges to 
an international system constructed on the basis that states are the only legitimate 
containers and users of violence. 
Second, the primary role of nuclear weapons in interstate relations in the fore-
seeable future is basic or central deterrence (deterring nuclear and large-scale con-
ventional aggression against the homeland) in a condition of asymmetric power 
relationships. In addition, nuclear deterrence serves as a backstop or insurance to 
avoid blackmail, preserve strategic autonomy (freedom to act), and cope with un-
anticipated security developments in a changing strategic environment. The offen-
sive (compellence, coercive diplomacy, war fighting) and defensive (counterforce 
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damage limitation) roles of nuclear weapons as well as strategic defense against 
nuclear weapons are likely to remain relatively marginal in utility and unlikely 
to surpass the deterrence role of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Only 
the United States is developing significant offensive and defensive capabilities and 
strategies. Technological limitations, funding constraints, the preferences and ca-
pabilities (conventional and nuclear) of other states, and the generally stable politi-
cal and strategic environment in the Asian security region are likely to limit the 
employment of nuclear weapons in these roles. 
Although deterrence continues to be the dominant strategy for the employment 
of nuclear weapons, the corKeption and practice of deterrence differ substantially 
across states and from that during the Cold War. This leads to the third and fourth 
propositions. The third finding is that widely differing goals and a broad spectrum 
of capabilities have resulted in an array of deterrence strategies ranging from ex-
istential deterrence through minimum deterrence to assured retaliation. All these 
strategies rely on the threat of punishment, but they differ on the force level and 
structure required to deter and on the scope of threats to be deterred. Because of 
their limited capabilities and small nuclear forces, weaker powers opt for deter-
rence strategies (existential and minimum deterrence) that emphasize uncertainty, 
risk of escalation to nuclear war, and absolute destruction rather than a secure 
second-strike capability that will result in certain retaliation and "unacceptable" 
damage as in an assured retaliation strategy. Weaker powers opt for existential 
and minimum deterrence strategies out of necessity; their preferred end point is 
assured retaliation. Countries with relatively large nuclear arsenals have retained 
assured retaliation capabilities against substantial nuclear weapon states. Although 
a range of deterrence strategies also existed during the Cold War, assured retali-
ation between the two superpowers provided the dominant frame for thinking 
about nuclear deterrence. All contemporary national deterrence strategies are still 
in a formative stage, and the new nuclear weapon states often do not have the req-
uisite capability to effectively implement professed strategies. It is thus important 
to distinguish between declaratory and operational doctrines and actual behavior 
in particular crisis situations. These can vary substantially. 
Fourth, the study argues that the absence of severe confrontations and the lim-
ited capabilities of the relatively small Asian nuclear forces have resulted in general 
deterrence postures. Although the United States has the largest and most sophis-
ticated nuclear arsenal and seeks additional capabilities to deal with new threats, 
it has not issued actor-specific threats that would result in nuclear retaliation or 
developed actor threat-specific capabilities. Its threats to rogue states and terror-
ist groups, for example, tend to be general, and those in relation to contingencies 
involving China are vague and implied. Other countries have chosen to focus 
on their relatively more urgent concerns, deferring response to lesser ones or at-
tempting to defuse them. Even on primary concerns, states rely on general and 
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implied threats without specifying red lines or specific response. There are very 
few instances where hostilities are intense and immediate and have resulted in the 
issuance of specific nuclear threats and development of capabilities to -carry out 
such threats. In all other cases, nuclear deterrence in Asia is implied and indirect. 
States maintain a broad range of capabilities, including nuclear weapons, and issue 
general threats to dissuade other states from seriously contemplating aggressioiL 
The fmal proposition on the significance and role of nuclear weapons is that 
the strategy of extended nuclear deterrence continues to be relevant for the secu-
rity of certain U.S. allies. In addition to deterring attacks on allies and preserving 
their strategic autonomy, extended nuclear deterrence reassures allies and prevents 
them from pursuing independent nuclear options. National sensitivities and com-
peting threat perceptions and demands of allies make crafting and implementing 
an effective and credible strategy of extended deterrence more difficult. 
Uniqueness and Common Discourse 
The role and significance of nuclear weapons in Asian national security strat-
egies do not appear unique. They appear to be a function of specific histories, 
strategic circumstances, security challenges, and national nuclear capabilities. The 
tendency toward ambiguity and secrecy, for example, is not a peculiar Asian cul-
tural trait but a function of the belief that such ambiguity and secrecy enhance the 
deterrence value of small nuclear forces. During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger 
(1957) posited that a strategy of ambiguity was employed by the Soviet Union and 
China in their revolutionary struggle against the West. Asian nuclear weapon 
states are not immune to the logic of nuclear weapons and their consequences. 
On common discourse, although certain states use similar terms such as mini-
mum deterrence and no first use, their interpretations vary across countries. There is 
no common vocabulary, and a common discourse is noticeable by its absence. A 
U.S.-China nuclear dialogue appears to have started, but there is no such dialogue 
between the United States and other countries or among Asian countries. A com-
mon discourse has been hindered by the tendency toward secrecy and ambiguity, 
by the reluctance of the recognized nuclear weapon states to accept new entrants, 
and the tendency rooted in political correctness to downplay the security role of 
nuclear weapons. However, as nuclear weapons will continue to exist and nuclear 
arsenals will expand in size and capability, it is imperative to begin bilateral and 
multilateral dialogues to foster a common understanding of the roles and implica-
tions of nuclear weapons. Thomas Schelling even advocates educating terrorist 
h . f . 1 12 groups on the catastrop IC consequences o usmg nuc ear weapons. 
Implications for National and Regional Security 
In exploring the implications of national nuclear strategies and more broadly 
nuclear weapons for national and regional security, this study advances three 
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propositions. First it posits that nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers and 
have a modifying effect on structure and its consequences. However, they do 
not fundamentally alter the distribution of power to make a difference in system 
structure or the pattern of security interaction. Nuclear weapons have not sub-
stantially altered the security dynamics in Asia. Certain nuclear strategies such as 
compellence, counterforce, and limited war could and have intensified existing 
threat perceptions and lines of enmity. However, they have not created new ones. 
Other strategies such as existential, minimum, and extended deterrence, and a 
posture of general deterrence have not exacerbated security situations. In fact, 
they have had an ameliorating effect. 
By contributing to greater self-reliance in deterrence, nuclear weapons reduce 
the salience of external balancing as a rationale for alliance among nuclear weapon 
states. However, alliances and alignments among them still make sense for other 
reasons. For nonnuclear weapon states that perceive a nuclear threat, alliance with 
a nuclear weapon state that can extend the deterrence function of its nuclear ar-
senal provides an incentive for alliance formation and sustenance. On conflict 
resolution, nuclear weapons do not advance or obstruct settlement of disputes. 
When they are relevant, nuclear weapons contribute to a situation of no war and 
no peace. The logic of the enormous destruction power of nuclear weapons argues 
against conflict resolution through the physical use of violence. However, nuclear 
weapons are not a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution. The grave risks associ-
ated with escalation to nuclear war in certain cases have induced parties to explore 
a diplomatic settlement. Dispute settlement, however, hinges on the willingness 
or unwillingness of conflicting parties to negotiate and compromise on political 
differences that underlie the dispute. 
Second, the study posits that nuclear weapons have contributed to the security 
of states and reinforced stability in the Asian security region that is underpinned by 
several pillars. Although there could be some destabilizing consequences, thus far 
nuclear weapons have not undermined stability in Asia. In fact, they have contrib-
uted to stability by assuaging national security concerns, preventing the outbreak 
of major wars, strengthening the status quo, increasing deterrence dominance, 
and reinforcing the trend in the region toward a reduction in the salience of force 
in international politics. For a number of reasons (acceptance of the political and 
territorial status quo; increase in the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of 
using force in a situation of complex interdependence; and the impracticability of 
resolving conflicts through the use of force) the offensive roles of force have been 
on the decline in Asia. Nuclear weapons reinforce this trend by enhancing deter-
rence dominance and making the cost of war among nuclear weapon states cata-
strophic and prohibitive, especially in a situation of complex interdependence. 
Finally, the study posits that if it is to continue to be relevant, the nuclear 
order that was forged during the Cold War era must adjust to accommodate con-
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temporary strategic realities, including a focus on Asia that has already become 
a core world region and may become the geopolitical center of the world in the 
twenty-first century. The new nuclear order must sustain deterrence in a situation 
of asymmetry; accommodate change by bringing in nuclear weapon states outside 
the NPT system; deal with the further spread of nuclear weapons by address-
ing security concerns of relevant states as well as through denial strategies; pre-
vent the spread of nuclear material, technology, and weapons to nonstate actors; 
and facilitate trade, investment, and technology transfer to promote the develop-
ment of nuclear energy, with adequate safeguards in place to prevent leakage of 
proliferation-sensitive parts. 
The above reading of the roles of nuclear weapons in national security strate-
gies and their regional security implications is a consequence of a "politics in 
command" approach that sees nuclear weapons as an instrument of state policy 
and understands their roles and implications in the context of the overall national 
priorities of states in a complex Asian political, strategic, and ec<lnomic landscape. 
Such a "benign" reading may be controversial and unacceptable to those who 
view nuclear weapons as the drivers of insecurity or for arms control, especially 
nonproliferation advocates who tend to see the world through the dangers of 
nuclear weapons. 
Premises and Definition 
Two premises inform this study. First, as will be evident by now, a security 
perspective that attaches importance to nuclear weapons but does not prejudge 
their salience girds this study. It takes seriously the security rationales advanced by 
states for the development of nuclear capabilities or reliance on those of an ally. In 
the aftermath of the Cold War, nonproliferation has been the dominant lens for 
the study of nuclear weapons. I argue that, while the spread of nuclear weapons 
remains a key international security concern, an exclusive or near exclusive reli-
ance on the nonproliferation lens, by rejecting or according insufficient attention 
to the security value attached to nuclear weapons, obscures and limits our under-
standing of the broader salience and role of nuclear weapons in national security 
strategies and the international implications that flow from them. 
Nuclear arsenals will continue to exist and inform the security policies of most 
major countries in the Asian security region for the foreseeable future. A perspec-
tive like that adopted in this study can provide valuable insights on a range of 
issues that cannot and would not be addressed by a nonproliferation approach. 
The insights would include a comprehensive understanding ofthe security poli-
cies and strategies of states and nonstate actors possessing or seeking to acquire 
nuclear weapons; the security challenges for which nuclear capabilities are con-
sidered relevant; the nature and content of national nuclear strategies; their im-
pact on subregional and regional security dynamics; and consequences for security 
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interdependence, stability, and security management. Investigation of these and 
related issues is crucial to understanding security in Asia and to the effort to build 
regional and global institutions to manage security, as well as to limit, control, 
and manage nuclear weapons and their consequences. An exclusive focus on pre-
venting or countering proliferation would obscure these issues or deal with them 
only indirectly, leading to unnecessarily benign or alarmist readings of nuclear-
related developments. The ethics of responsibility require us to address the nuclear 
situation in all its dimensions. 
Second, this study proceeds on the basis that Asia has become a core region 
of the world with its own distinct dynamics and that it is likely to become more 
consequential in international affairs. The study also treats Asia defined broadly 
as a single security region. The distinctiveness and increasing significance of Asia 
are addressed in Chapter r. Here I limit myself to the definition of Asia as a single 
security region and the broadening of that definition, if only tentatively, in this 
study to include the Middle East. This premise informs the delimitation of the 
study to states that are part of the Asian security region and the exclusion of Brit-
ain and France from it. 
In line with my earlier work, Asia is conceptualized in this study as a single 
security region comprising several interconnected subregional clusters in North-
east, Southeast, South, and Central Asia, with Northeast Asia as its core (Alagappa 
1998, 2003). This conceptualization is based on both security interdependence 
and growing internal and external recognition. The lines of amity and enmity 
that are regionally significant in Asia center largely on China but also on India 
and Japan. Beijing's security concerns span all four subregions, and China is a 
primary driver of international security for many countries in these subregions. 
India's security concerns span South, Southeast, Southwest, and Central Asia, and 
China in Northeast Asia. New Delhi's security relations with Tokyo appear to 
be on the uptick. Japan's security concerns span Northeast and Southeast Asia; 
South and Central Asia are also of increasing interest to the government in Tokyo. 
Conceptualizing Asia as a security region does not exclude countries from outside 
the region. Asia is the security footprint, but certain aspects of conflict formation 
and security governance in Asia, especially among the major powers, cannot be 
explained without reference to key outside powers, particularly the United States. 
As Chapter I will show, the United States plays a crucial security role in the 
region. Its policies influence major power relations in significant ways, and Sino-
American relations are emerging as the central security dynamic affecting Asia. 
Thus, although not physically in the region, the United States is conceptualized 
in this study as part of the Asian security region. Although its impact does not 
compare with that of the former Soviet Union, Russia is part of the Asian security 
region by dint of its physical geography, its relevance to security in Northeast 
Asia, and its increasing interaction with China and India. 
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The delimitation of Asia as a single security region was received with skepticism 
in the 1990s, but developments since then have reinforced security interdependence 
among the various subregions in Asia and my case for such delimitation. All of the 
following are testimony to the increasing interconnectedness among the major 
powers in the Asian security region: the growing power and influence of China; 
rising concerns about international terrorism; Japan's developing strategic rela-
tions with Australia and India; India's sustained economic growth and its growing 
relations with all major powers, especially the growing economic, strategic, and 
defense relationship with the United States; the growing salience of the Sino-
Indian relationship; the increasing Chinese, Russian, and Indian interest in Cen-
tral Asia, and the newfound American interest and role in that region; the demon-
strated interest of Japan and Southeast Asian countries to draw all relevant major 
powers into Asian regional institutions; the footprint and expanding membership 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and the 
East Asian Summit; the growing salience of the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion; and trilateral dialogues such as those among China-India-Russia, the United 
States-Japan-India, and the United States-China-Japan. The deepening security 
connections among the subregions further contribute to the development of an 
Asia-wide security region. It should be noted that a region is used here to denote 
a group of countries whose in-group intensity of interaction is significant for their 
well-being or exceeds that with external actors (or both); it does not necessarily 
imply greater cohesion, identity, or ability to be a coherent actor in internal and 
international matters. 
This study tentatively broadens the definition of Asia to include the adjoin-
ing Middle East region. Interactions based on religion, terrorist networks, en-
ergy supply, labor migration, and trade and investment, among others, have raised 
the importance of the Middle East for Asian countries. The strategic concerns of 
the major Asian countries increasingly include the Middle East. Islam and trade 
were historically important links connecting the Arab world, Persia, South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. The oil supplies of the Arab world on which 
several major Asian countries are heavily dependent, the resurgence of Islam, the 
emergence and radicalization of some transnational Islamic groups, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the regional aspira-
tions of Iran are some of the modern-day issues that link the Middle East to Asia. 
This study investigates whether nuclear weapons deepen security interconnected-
ness between these regions or subregions. Nuclear weapons inform the security 
thinking of several states in the adjoining Middle which has one undeclared 
nuclear weapon state (Israel), and at least one other state (Iran) that is believed 
to have a covert nuclear weapon program. Recent developments appear to have 
rekindled interest in a nuclear option in Egypt. Concerned about the Iranian 
nuclear program, the Gulf Cooperation Council decided in December 2006 to 
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establish a nuclear research program for the first time. A nuclear Israel has not 
directly affected security in Asia. Would a nuclear Iran, a state with regional am-
bitions, deepen connections among South Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Middle 
East? What would be the security implication of this, and would it justify broad-
ening the definition of the Asian security region to include the Middle East? 
About the Book 
This study is organized in three parts. The Introduction and Part I set out the 
rationale, purpose, and propositions advanced in the study; they explore the con-
temporary security environment in and affecting Asia, as well as likely changes, 
with particular reference to drivers of insecurity and change; and they develop a 
historical and conceptual perspective to guide investigations in the ensuing chap-
ters. Part II investigates the nuclear policies and strategies of six nuclear weapon 
states (the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel) in the broadly 
defined Asian security region, four states that rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia), two aspirant states (North Korea 
and Iran), nonstate organizations in Asia that may seek nuclear weapon capabil-
ity, and the ASEAN states as a group that seek to make Southeast Asia a nuclear 
weapon-free zone. Drawing on the case studies in Part II, the two chapters in 
Part III explore the significance and roles of nuclear weapons in national security 
strategies and their implications for international security interdependence, con-
flict management, and regional stability. 
Notes 
I. Glenn Snyder (1961) first articulated the distinction between deterrence through 
punishment and deterrence through denial in 1959. 
2. Other factors that have been advanced as contributing to the "long peace" include 
structural bipolarity (Waltz 1979), obsolescence of war among major powers (Mueller 
1989), and reduction in the salience and spoils of war in the context of growing economic 
interdependence (Rosecrance 1986). It is important not to overstate the Euro-centric idea 
of a long peace. The first two to three decades of the Cold War era were in fact marked 
by several crises between the superpowers, and there were several "hot" wars involving 
them, especially in Asia (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan). The "long peace" in Asia only 
began in 1979. 
J. George W. Bush, Graduation speech at West Point. June I, 2002. Available at http:/ I 
www.whitehouse .gov I news/releasesl2oo2/o6hoo2o6or-3 .html. 
4· George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002. Available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/or/20020I29-II.html. 
5· The George W. Bush administration did, however, seek to differentiate between re-
sponsible democratic states like India and "rogue" states like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. 
6. Mohamed ElBaradei (2006) states that "under the NPT there is no such thing as a 
'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' nuclear weapon state." The recognition offive states as hold-
Introduction 3I 
ers of nuclear weapons was regarded as a matter of transition. The NPT does not confer 
permanent status on the five countries. 
7· In 1964 China adopted an NFU policy. In 1995 Beijing expanded this commitment 
when it issued an unconditional negative security assurance. See China's National State-
ment on Security Assurance of April 5, 1995 available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/ 
engdocs/npto495a.htm. Western analysts have tended to view the NFU commitment as 
symbolic and a reflection of operational constraints, rather than as a commitment to an 
altruistic principle. See, for example, Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes (2oor). lain Johnston 
(1995/6) notes that many military strategists do not support the NFU policy. Major Gen-
eral (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang (2002) has presented certain scenarios (Washington's tactical use 
of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait conflict, U.S. conventional attacks on China's nu-
clear weapons and facilities, and limited nuclear attack on China) that might force China 
to reconsider its NFU policy. See also Dingli Shen (2005). 
8. See "DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War De-
terrent." Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, October 3, 2006. 
9. Layne (1993) and Waltz (1993), for example, argued that unipolarity would be short 
lived. 
ro. Biddle (2ooo) disputes the claim that there has been an RMA and argues that the 
ability to manage complexity underpins the widening gap in military power. 
II. It is possible to argue that missile defense, when it becomes effective against sub-
stantial nuclear threats and the RMA together, may mark a fundamental technological 
change with strategic consequences. 
12. Thomas Schelling made this point in the discussion of the paper "Prospects for 
Nuclear Terrorism in Asia" at the first workshop of the East-West Center Washington 
project on "Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia" in Washington, D.C., 
May r~3, 2006. 
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